The three handwritten manuscripts are in different stages of readiness. OMDP is a first draft. It seems unfinished, and the last several pages include a digression headed "Elements of grammar for the young" (p. 17). PAD is a series of independent two-and three-page i nvestigations. Russell removed page 16 of PAD, and inserted it in OMD as page 49. 5 This establishes that OMD was completed after PAD. OMD is also a first draft, although it is in more finished form than OMDP. The manuscript includes 41 pages entitled "Private notes". These begin with a parenthetical remark, "(From this point onwards, I have merely put down any remarks that occurred to me, without system or consecutiveness.)"6 At the end of these notes is an outline of a discussion with Whitehead, which shows that Russell regarded OMD at least as a finished draft. " 32-55
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Issue or Problem 5The page numbered "16" is missing from the PAD manuscript. In OMD, p. 49 has "~~' written in the top ri~ht corner. In the top left corner Russell had written "Denoting etc.", which appears in the same place on the pages of PAD. "MD" is also written in the top left corner of the page in question, and it appears in that place on al I the other pages of OMD.
6 OMD, p. 57. hree unpublished manuscripts in the Russell Archives treat the general topic of denoting: (1) "On the Meaning and Denotation of Phrases" (OMDP, 24 pp.), (2) "Points About Denoting" (PAD, 18 pp.), and "On Meaning and Denotation" COMO, 98 pp.). These were probably wri tten after Russell's 1904 review of Meinong. 1 They clearly were written before "On Denoting", published in 1905. 2 Little is actually known about the specific preparation of any of these manuscripts. There seems to be slight chance of uncovering additional information about their precise dates. 3 In the first section below I describe the manuscripts and the textual evidence for thei r proper ordering. In the second section I discuss the development of the theory of denoting. There is a continuity in Russell 's thought from The Principles of Mathematics 4 to "On Denoting". This progression provides a perspective on why denoting phrases in general, and definite descriptions in particular, are of central importance to Russell's logical theory. For Russell, the relation of a word to its meaning is merely a part of the theory of language. The significant relationships are the logical relations between meanings. The chart, "Textual structure of the unpublished manuscripts", provides a useful outline of the topics covered in the manuscripts. It allows us to see an overlap between OMD and each of the other two manuscripts. The structural similarities are with topics covered and with the order of presentation. The first part of OMD (pp. 1-14) coincides with OMDP. The next part of OMD (pp. 15-57) coincides with PAD. There is almost no overlap of topics between OMDP and PAD. The definitions and explanations of terminology which are so prominently displayed in the beginning sections of OMD and OMDP are omitted in PAD. However, the implicit theory of PAD is clearly the same as OMDP. This, together with the unfinished nature of PAD, leads to the conclusion that PAD is a series of commentaries and digressions written after Russell had completed OMDP.
The proposed order of the manuscripts is, therefore, (1) OMDP, (2) PAD, and then (3) OMD.
"On Denoting"
Several major changes occurred in Russell's philosophy of logic and language between 1903 and 1905. 7 The manuscripts are specific steps in Russell's development of the theory in "On Denoting". He came to see denoting phrases as the only exception in his theory of language that proper names denote and all other words mean: he held that denoting phrases both mean and denote. Only denoting phrases raise the logical question of the relation of a meaning to a denotation.
In 1903, Russell had stated that every word occurring in a sentence has a meaning, in the sense that it stands for something other than itself (Principles, p. 42). Words and sentences are linguistic entities. They indicate te rms, wh ich have bei ng (p. 43).
Things are terms indicated by proper names, and concepts are terms indicated by all other words.
Indication is a relation between a linguistic entity (a word) and a non-linguistic entity (a term). Some concepts (which are terms) denote other terms. In parti cul ar, some concepts denote th i ngs. Denotation is a relationship between two non-linguistic entities, between two terms. We distinguish indication, a relation between a word and a term, from denotation, a relation between two terms.
The distinction between "indication" and "denotation" was essential to Russell's theory in the Principles of Mathematics. In Appendix A he compared it with Frege' s theory: "The di sti nction between mean ing (Sinn) and indication (Bedeutung) is roughly, though not exactly, equivalent to 7S ee my '~ropositional Functions and Russel I 's Philosophy of Language 1903 Language -1914 where this is developed more completely. It is argued there that Russell's phi losophy of language was undergoing constant change and development through this period, and most significantly that he did not confuse a sign with the thing signified, or use and mention.
30 my distinction between a concept as such and what the concept denotes ... " (p.502). Russell was careful to note that, for Frege, "Bedeutung" is a relation between a word and an object. This is the reason, that Russell translated it as "indication" and not "denotation". In Frege's theory, proper names have both Sinn and Bedeutung. Russell disagreed: "It seems to me that only such proper names as are derived from concepts by means of the can be said to' have meaning, and that such words as John merely indicate without meaning" (p. 502).
In the Principles, proper names indicate some object, but have no meaning. All other expressions have meaning, and most do not indicate objects. Denoting expressions, or phrases, are not proper names, and therefore they have meaning. But a denoting expression can indicate an object. Denoting expressions are unique because they are the only linguistic expressions which can have both meaning and indication. When a definite description succeeds, some unique object is indicated by the expression. In addition some meaning is indicated by the expression, and this meaning also has a relation to the object indicated. This relation is denotation.
The central importance of denoting expressions in the Pyinaiples was that they are the only expressions which have both a meaning and an indication. In "On Denoting" Russell was to deny this and claim that they have no meaning and only sometimes do they refer to an object. "In the '" theory which I advocate, [i n the denoti ng phrase] there is no meaning, and only sometimes a denotation."s The net effect of "On Denoting" is to eliminate the need for a separate relation between a meani ng and an object.
The theory in the Prinaiples remained relatively unchanged in Russell's '1904 review of Meinong. 9 However, the three unpublished manuscripts are all clearly before "On Denoting". They all al ter the indication-denotation distinction. But the double relationship between (1) a word (or phrase) and an object, and (2) Analysis, . "Indicate" occurs only twice in the lengthy article. The second occurrence, in October--"Adopting Meinong's terminology, according to which words express a state of mind, but indicate (bedeuten) an object ... " (p. 62)--is noteworthy, because Russell attributes this use to Meinong. However, Russell continues to translate "bedeuten" as "indicate", so I believe he was sti II using the distinction of the Principles.
(1) those that denote without deno ting; (3) those that both
(1), is to (2), the death of indication-denotation distinction. This is stated clearly at the beginning of the manuscript: "A proper name, such as ArthW' BalfoW', is destitute of meaning, but denotes an individual. On the other hand, verbs and adjectives have meaning, but no denotation" (p. 1). Phrases with "the" both mean and denote. Russell does not directly discuss the relationship between the meaning and the denotation. However, on several occasions, he says that the meaning denotes an object (pp. 4-5).
Denoting, therefore, is a relation both between a word and an object and a meaning and an object. But this is only the case with denoting phrases:
Words and phrases are of three kinds: meaning; (2) Only denoting phrases both mean and denote. 10 All other expressions either denote (and lack meaning) or express a meaning (and lack denotation). It is only with denoting phrases that Russell needs to be concerned with a meaning expressed denoting the denotation of a phrase. It· is a direct result of his collapsing the indication/denotation dichotomy which leads to his double use of "denotation".
In OMD this double use of "denotation" is eliminated: "We must distinguish, first of all, the relation of the phrase to that of which it is a name, from the relation of what the phrase means to that of which it is a name" (p. 2). The former, the rel ation of the phrase to that whi ch it names, is "designation" (not "indication"). The latter, the relation of what the phrase means to what the phrase names, is "denotation". More directly, Russell explains, A phrase such as "the present Prime Minister of England" designates an entity, in this case Mr. Arthur Balfour, while it expresses a meaning, which is complex, and does not, as a rule, include the entity designated as a constituent; the relation of the meaning may be called a description of the entity, and the phrase may be called a descripti ve phrase. 11 This represents a subtle change from the Principles where all words indicate terms, either things or concepts. In OMD, proper names designate things, and all other words express a meaning. Descriptive phrases designate an entity, and in addition express a meaning, which denotes the entity designated. There is a crucial dichotomy between "designation" 10This is not really accurate. At this time Russell thought that pronouns were disguised denoting phrases and had both meaning and denotation (p. 17). But he did not discuss this in any of the later manuscripts. llOMD, p. 7. This use of "express" is probably due to Meinong. Cf.
the quotation in fn. 9 above. 32 and "denotation". "Denoting" is the logically important relation, whereas "designating" and "expressing" have to do only with a theory of language .12 But the OMD theory was never really considered adequate by Russell.
The "Private notes" which follow OMD provide an indication of the degree of Russell's frustration. We are, however, able to construe some of these remarks as a premature version of the theory in "On Denoting".
Let me quote Russell extensively:
Just as x itself has a definite meaning, so "x is human" has one also; but it is the denotation, not the meaning, that we employ: the denotation is that variable proposition which we before regarded as the variable meaning. Perhaps this modifies other previous conclusions.
'" Now "if x is human, X is mortal" also expresses a definite meaning, but of this meaning, the meaning of "x is human" is not a constituent, though the various propositions denoted by "x is human" are constituents of the corresponding propositions in the denotation of "if x is human, x is mortal". (OMO, p. 64) .
•• If we have (say) fx~~x, the meaning of fx (according to what we have just decided) does not occur at all in this proposition, but only the denotation. Consequently fx, it might seem, cannot stand for the meaning. And as regards denotation, though the terms of the denotation of fx severally occur in the total denotation of fx~~x, the denotation of fx as a whole does not enter in; it enters into (x) .fx.~.(x) .~x, but not into fx~~x or (x) .fx~~x. This difficulty, however, is met by our previous conclusion, that we must always consider the whole of an expression. (OMO, p. 65) But Russell rejects this line of reasoning at this time.
It is plain that 1 is a fundamental logical notion, and that it would be merely shirking to invent a dodge for getting on without using it. (OMO, p. 84) Two of Whitehead's criticisms summarized by Russell at the end end of these notes are worth mentioning:
2. Whitehead denies that denoting phrases are names in the same sense as proper names.
5. He thinks that in a denoting phrase both meaning and denotation are involved in a Proposition in much the same way. (OMO, p. 93) These are funadmental objections. Although we can only conjecture at connections, Whitehead's criticisms may have provided the motivation for
Russell to return to the theory mentioned earlier in the private notes.
At any rate, Russell is clearly floundering at the close of the manuscript. He writes: "There is something still wrong with my theory of meaning and denotation" (p. 94). And again, "But the theory of denoting must be reformed" (p. 95).
The Fregean theory which Russell criticizes in "On Denoting" is a variation of the theories in OMDP, PAD, and OMD.
120MD, p. 5.
[Frege] distinguishes, in a denoting phrase, two elements, which we may call the meaning and the denotation.
A footnote on the same page reads:
In this theory we shall say that the denoting phrase expresses a meaning; and we shall say both of the phrase and of the meaning that they denote a denotation. 13
In summation, there is a steady progression of Russell's theory from (1) The Principles of Mathematics through (2) OMDP, (3) PAD, (4) OMD, and leading to (5) "On Denoting". With this development as a guide, we are in a better position to read and evaluate "On Denoting". In particular, it is necessary to recognize that "Frege's theory" whi ch Russell is criticizing may, or may not, be Frege's theory, but it was certainly Russell's theory in late 1904 and early 1905.
Russell notes that this is similar to his theory. in the Principles, but we can easily see that there are important differences. (1) Russell is now translating "Bedeutung" as "denotation", not "indication", which he used in the Frinciples. (2) The denoting phrase expresses a meaning, as in OMD; it does not indicate it. And (3) the use of "terms" is eliminated from the account.
The crucial changes in the manuscripts from the position in the Principles surround (1) the relation between a denoting phrase and the meaning of the phrase, and (2) the relation between the meaning of a denoting phrase and the object denoted. Russell is bothered immensely by these relationships. Significantly, they are only crucial for denoting phrases. They are the only expressions which have both a meaning and a denotation. This is not the case with Frege's theory. As Russell notes, Frege distinguishes meaning and denotation everywhere. Thus, Russ ell is not conce rned to refute Frege' s en ti re framewo rk, but rather Russell's own old theory, which happens to coincide with part of Frege's.
In "On Denoting" Russell contextually defines denoting phrases: " ... we must abandon the view that the denotation is what is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases."14 This eliminates the logical significance of denoting phrases. Denoting phrases are not genuine constituents of propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur.
Depa rtmen t of Ph i1 osophy Uni ve rs ity of Georgi a 13Essays in Analysis, p. 108. 14Ibid., p. 109.
